





















O	 sucesso	das	 clínicas	 jurídicas	 deve-se	principalmente	 à	 ideia	 de	 que	 elas	
podem	 dar	 uma	 conotação	 profissional	 aos	 cursos	 de	 direito,	 enquanto	 a	
evocação	 da	 tradição	 realista,	 do	 direito	 em	 ação	 e	 a	 referência	 à	 justiça	
social	parecem	relegadas	à	mera	função	de	um	mito	legitimador.	Somente	se	
caracterizada	 por	 uma	 opção	 teórica	 precisa	 que	 distingue	 claramente	 o	
texto	normativo	da	norma	e	identifique	o	hiato	entre	os	dois	como	o	espaço	
do	 jurista,	 as	 clínicas	 jurídicas	 poderão	 estar	 no	 centro	 de	 uma	 mudança	
radical	 na	 educação	 jurídica.	Mesmo	 a	 orientação	 para	 a	 justiça	 social	 não	
está	 implícita	 em	nenhuma	experiência	 clínica.	 Somente	 configurando	uma	
clínica	 jurídica	 como	 um	 laboratório	 para	 os	 alunos	 aprenderem	 a	 usar	
fantasia	 jurídica	 para	 transformar	 os	 problemas	 particulares	 de	 pessoas	
marginalizadas	em	reivindicações	que	podem	ser	apresentadas	a	um	juiz,	a	
clínica	contribui	para	o	acesso	desses	indivíduos	à	justiça.	




The	 success	 of	 legal	 clinics	 is	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 they	 can	 give	 a	
professionalizing	 connotation	 to	 the	 degree	 courses	 in	 law,	 while	 the	
                                                











justice	 seem	 relegated	 to	 the	mere	 function	 of	 a	 legitimising	myth.	 Only	 if	
characterized	 by	 a	 precise	 theoretical	 option	 that	 clearly	 distinguishes	
normative	text	 from	norm	and	identifies	the	hiatus	between	the	two	as	the	
space	of	the	jurist,	can	legal	clinics	be	at	the	heart	of	a	radical	change	in	legal	
education.	Even	 the	orientation	 towards	social	 justice	 is	not	 implicit	 in	any	









In	 recent	 years,	 the	 law	 courses	 of	 Italian	 universities	 have	 seen	 a	 significant	 spread	 of	
experiences	 that	 call	 themselves	 “legal	 clinics”.	 The	 lowest	 common	 denominator	 of	 these	
different	 experiences	 is	 a	 didactic	method	of	 law	based	on	 a	 “practical”	 approach,	 aimed	 at	
supplementing,	but	usually	not	overcoming,	the	traditional	legal	teaching	of	civil	law	contexts.	
This	 trend	 seems	 to	 place	 law	 courses	 within	 what	 has	 been	 defined	 as	 “a	 global	 clinical	
movement”	 (Bloch	and	Menon,	2012)2	 focused	on	enhancing	 the	professionalizing	aspect	of	
legal	teaching	(a	trend	highlighted,	in	Italy,	also	by	the	recent	inclusion	of	a	semester	of	legal	
practice	 in	 the	 curriculum	 of	 a	 master’s	 degree3).	 It	 is	 this	 enhancement	 that	 generally	
supports	 the	 claim	 that,	 from	 a	 didactic	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 clinical	 approach	 represents	 a	
significant	step	forward.	
In	an	era	characterized	by	a	philosophy	of	history	that	sees	the	market	as	the	best	possible	
tool	 for	 regulating	 society,	 legal	 clinics	 seem	 to	 be	 the	 teaching	 methodology	 that,	 finally,	
aligns	 the	 teaching	 of	 law	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 contemporary	 society.	 At	 a	 time	 when	 public	
competitions,	the	traditional	goal	of	law	graduates,	are	becoming	less	and	less	frequent,	legal	
clinics	 allow	 legal	 faculties	 to	 attract	 students	 back	 and	 regain	 a	 professionalizing	 role	
(Marella	and	Rigo,	2015,	p.	546).	
By	 integrating	 clinical-legal	 education	 into	 their	 degree	 programmes,	 Italian	 universities	
aspire	 to	 be	 in	 line	with	 US	 degree	 programmes	where,	 since	 the	 1970s,	 legal	 clinics	 have	
successfully	spread	to	what	are	considered	to	be	the	top	Law	Schools	(Harvard,	Yale,	Stanford,	
                                                
2	 To	 realize	 the	 success	 of	 the	 clinical	 didactic	 approach	 in	 continental	 Europe,	 it	 is	 enough	 to	 remember	 the	 numerous	
universities	that	have	activated	legal	clinics.	They	include	Science	Po	(Paris),	Humboldt	(Berlin),	Universidad	Carlos	III	de	Madrid.	
On	 the	development	of	 legal	 clinics	 in	 Italy,	 see	 the	 research	by	Clelia	Bartoli	 (2015).	 For	 a	 survey	of	 the	development	of	 the	
clinical	 movement	 in	 Europe	 see	 Bartoli	 (2016).	 A	 quick	 overview	 of	 the	 development	 of	 legal	 clinics	 worldwide	 and	 their	
polymorphic	character	can	be	found	in	Marella	and	Rigo	(2015,	p.	540-1).	
3	 The	 framework	 agreement	 signed	 on	 24	 February	 2017	 between	 the	 Italian	 bar	 and	 the	 directors	 of	 law	 departments	
implemented	the	reform	of	the	Italian	legal	profession	(Law	no.	247	of	31	December	2012),	which	in	turn	had	partially	modified	
the	ways	of	carrying	out	the	traineeship	for	accessing	the	profession.	Now	a	law	student	in	her	final	year	can	carry	out	a	semester	
of	 legal	 practice	 as	 part	 of	 the	 curriculum,	 thus	 anticipating	 part	 of	 the	 18	months	 traineeship	 that,	 originally,	 could	 only	 be	
carried	out	after	graduating.	The	agreement	provides	that	the	trainee’s	professional	guarantees,	under	the	supervision	of	the	bar,	




Columbia,	NYU,	Cornell,	 etc.).	According	 to	 a	 recent	 survey	 conducted	 for	 the	Center	 for	 the	
Study	of	Applied	Legal	Education	 by	R.R.	Kuehn	and	D.A.	 Santacroce	 (www.csale.org),	 in	 the	
society	considered	as	the	model	par	excellence	of	a	dynamic	organization	capable	of	keeping	
up	with	 the	market,	 in	 the	 academic	 year	 2016/2017	 there	were	 1433	 active	 legal	 clinics,	
distributed	in	187	Law	Schools,	with	an	average	of	7	clinics	for	each	of	them.	
The	success	of	legal	clinics	is	therefore	linked,	in	the	first	place,	to	their	offering	themselves	
as	 the	 response	 of	 law	 degree	 courses	 to	 the	 social	 pressure	 –	 supported	 /	 fuelled	 by	 the	
universities	themselves	–	which	calls	for	training	to	“produce”	jurists	able	to	quickly	enter	the	
professional	world.	 In	 Italy,	 and	 in	Europe	 in	general,	 this	pressure	has	been	elected	as	 the	
pivot	of	the	so-called	Bologna	Process,	which	marks	the	shift	of	university	courses	from	places	
institutionally	responsible	for	the	development	of	a	knowledge	and	“culture”	not	intended	for	
their	 commercialisation	but	aimed	at	 the	overall	 improvement	of	 social	 life,	 to	 locations	 for	
the	production	of	professionalizing	knowledge.	The	university	system	is	no	longer	conceived	
as	 aimed	 firstly	 at	 the	production	of	 a	 social	 good,	 but	 as	 an	 endowment,	 a	wealth,	 private,	
exclusive,	to	be	sold	on	the	labour	market.4	In	universities	that	have	undergone	this	dramatic	
twist,	 legal	 clinics	 are	 the	 ideal	 tool	 of	 law	 degree	 courses	 that	 must	 no	 longer	 present	











on	 a	 rhetorical	 level	 they	 refer	 to	 the	 legal-realist	 approach	 and	 claim	 an	 “ontological”	




















rights	 struggles,	 social	 justice	 and	 critique	of	 law.	 It	 allegedly	 shows	how	 “a	 legal	 clinic	 can	
become	[...]	an	actor	of	transformation”,	arousing	students’	enthusiasm,	awakening	them	from	
their	 frequent	 torpor	 of	 apathetic	 receptors	 of	 “frontal	 lessons”.	 This	 affair	 also	 revives	 the	
splendour	of	the	original	heroic	phase	of	the	legal	clinics	that	developed	in	the	United	States	
at	the	turn	of	the	1970s.	These,	in	a	historical	moment	marked	by	attention	to	racial,	gender	
and	 social	 justice	 issues,	 characterized	 themselves	 as	 the	 ‘Trojan	 horse’	 through	 which	
contestation	 entered	 the	 cathedrals	 of	 legal	 knowledge,	 prompting	 them	 to	 focus	 on	 the	
difficulties	of	access	to	justice	of	the	so-called	weak.	Hence	the	connotation	of	legal	clinics	as	
“ontologically”	 suited	 to	 take	 charge	 of	 the	 personal	 problems	 of	 disadvantaged	 and	
discriminated	people,	guaranteeing	them	access	to	legal	“knowledge”	even	before	justice.	
On	the	wings	of	this	founding	myth,	the	spread	of	legal	clinics	has	been	accompanied	by	a	
rhetoric	 referring	 to	 the	 famous	 opposition	 between	 law	 in	 books	 and	 law	 in	 action,	
developed	almost	a	century	ago	by	Roscoe	Pound,	one	of	the	fathers	of	American	legal	realism.	
The	 clinics	 therefore	 seem	 to	 claim	 an	 approach	 to	 law	 that	 is	 in	 radical	 contrast	 to	 the	
Enlightenment	 tradition.	 Apparently,	 they	 claim	 a	 connotation	 that	 is	 disruptive	 to	 the	
dominant	 European	 continental	 legal	 conception	 and,	 at	 least,	 subversive	 to	 the	 traditional	
hierarchy	 of	 American	 legal	 knowledge.	 The	 latter,	 in	 accordance	 with	 a	 model	 of	 society	
based	on	contract	and	property,	attaches	a	leading	role	to	the	civilistic	doctrine,	assumed,	like	
that	which	accompanies	the	Napoleonic	Code	in	Europe,	as	unitary,	systematic	and	coherent.	
In	 spite	 of	 these	 claims,	 the	 traditional	 conception	 of	 law	 and	 its	 teaching	 has	 shown	 in	
recent	decades	an	obvious	 capacity	 to	 resist	and	neutralize	 the	clinical	movement’s	 critical-
innovative	 push	 and	 to	 make	 the	 movement	 functional	 to	 consolidate	 its	 domination.	
Retracing	his	career	from	a	Yale	law	student	in	the	late	1960s	to	a	Harvard	professor	twenty	
years	later,	Duncan	Kennedy	(1982,	1983),	one	of	the	most	influential	authors	of	critical	legal	









of	 the	 clinical-legal	 method,	 by	 virtue	 of	 his	 article	 “Why	 not	 a	 clinical	 lawyer	 school?”,	







would	 do;	 and	we	make	 diagnoses	 as	 doctors	 do	when	 they	 are	 next	 to	 the	 sick’s	 bed.	 But	
where	should	we	acquire	such	a	legal-medical	culture	if	not	in	a	legal	clinic?”.	
In	support	of	the	founding	myth	of	legal	clinics,	it	can	be	argued	that	there	is	some	affinity	
–	 a	 common	 sensitivity	 –	 between	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 interests,	 which	 developed	 from	
Jhering’s	 views,	 and	 American	 realism.	 The	 connection	 between	 clinical	 didactics	 and	 legal	
realism,	and	with	it	the	link	with	an	attention	to	the	disadvantaged’s	access	to	justice,	appears	
less	 tenable	when	we	consider	 that	 in	 Italy	 the	 first	 to	hope	and	urge	 the	 spread	of	 clinical	
teaching	 of	 law	 was	 Francesco	 Carnelutti,	 the	 founder	 of	 the	 “systematic”	 or	 “historical-
dogmatic”	 school.	 Tracing	 his	 profile,	 Giovanni	 Tarello,	 the	 greatest	 Italian	 legal	 realist,	
dismissed	 the	 connection	 between	 clinical	 approach	 and	 concern	 for	 the	 disadvantaged’s	
access	 to	 justice,	 writing	 that	 Carnelutti	 excelled	 in	 the	 profession	 of	 lawyer	 “in	 which	 he	
earned	the	reputation	of	man	not	disinterested”.	Tarello	(1977)	went	on	to	point	out	that:	
	
Carnelutti’s	 contribution	 to	 criminal	 disciplines	 had	 a	 clearly	 formalistic	
character,	and	its	role	was	supportive	of	that	of	the	“technical-juridical”	school	
and	 absolutely	 inserted	 in	 the	 political	 tendency	 of	 the	 fascist	 regime.	 The	









in	 a	 structure	 immanent	 in	 every	 legal	 system,	 a	 structure	 that	 the	 jurist	 ‘discovers’	 as	 the	
natural	scientist”	
In	 1934,	 therefore	 in	 the	 same	 years	 of	 Frank’s	 article,	 Carnelutti	 published	 an	 essay	
entitled	 “Law	Clinic”,	 in	which,	 in	 line	with	his	 theoretical	position,	 the	 legal-realistic	aspect	
had	no	role,	nor	had	attention	to	social	justice,	while	the	professionalizing	aspect	was	central.	
The	opportunity	to	adapt	the	medical	clinic	method	to	the	study	of	law	was	not	seen	as	a	way	
of	 questioning	 the	 foundations	 of	 the	 European	 continental	 tradition,	 let	 alone	 its	 social	
structure,	 but	 as	 a	 way	 of	 beginning	 to	 meet	 the	 prospective	 jurists’	 need	 for	 a	 practical	
training	ground.	Carnelutti,	just	like	Jhering	and	Frank,	noted	in	fact	that,	like	the	doctor,	the	
jurist	 is	called	to	solve	problems	that	 in	real	 life	affect	and	often	afflict	man.	But	“unlike	the	











the	 impossibility	 of	 relying	 on	 an	 ordered	 picture	 of	 the	 legal	 sources,	 the	 reference	 to	 the	




the	 growing	 emergence	 of	what	 is	 confusedly	 defined	 as	 soft	 law	 and	 by	 the	 prevalence	 of	
nonconforming	implementation	practices,	sometimes	considered,	in	particular	by	legislators,	
arbitrary	 or	 illegitimate	 (in	 this	 rhetoric	 it	 is	 often	 difficult	 to	 distinguish	 the	 Courts’	
constitutionally	 oriented	 readings	 of	 normative	 texts	 from	 delegification).	 The	 crisis	 of	 the	













under	 a	 general	 rule.	 This	 approach	 is	 somehow	 implicit	 in	 the	medical	 analogy.	 The	 ‘legal	
clinic’	 follows	 the	 lines	of	 the	 ‘clinics’	 of	medical	 courses:	doctors’	 clinical	practice	does	not	
call	medical	science	 into	question,	 just	as	 legal	practice	should	not	call	 into	question	 jurists’	
traditional	conceptual	apparatus,	“legal	science”.	Medical	students,	after	learning	anatomy	and	




approach	 to	 professionalisation	 is	 the	 emphasis	 on	 “lawyering”,	 a	 term	which,	 according	 to	
the	 Collins	 Dictionary,	 means	 in	 American	 English	 “the	 profession	 of	 being	 a	 lawyer;	 the	
practice	 of	 law”.	 Identifying	 the	 educational	 content	 of	 clinics	 in	 lawyering	 is,	 therefore,	 to	
implicitly	 reduce	 the	practice	 of	 law,	 law	 in	 action,	 to	 the	practice	 of	 the	 legal	 professional.	






background	 conception	 of	 law	 taught	 in	 universities	 is	 confirmed	 by	 clinical	 teaching	 often	
consisting	 in	 practices	 of	 simulation	 of	 legal	 activities	 and	 in	 the	 study	 of	 judicial	 cases.	 In	






the	 jurist’s	 experience	 is	 the	 relational	 and	 social	 dimension:	 empathy	 (or	 dislike)	 for	 the	
person	posing	the	problem	and	the	sharing	of	(or	aversion	to)	the	interest	she	wants	to	claim.	
But,	 above	 all,	 it	 removes	 the	 fundamental	 problem	of	 translating	what	 afflicts	 a	 person,	 to	






time	 when	 the	 clinical	 movement	 was	 yet	 to	 consolidate,	 presented	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	







for	Human	Rights”	 (CLEDU)	at	Palermo	University.	 Indeed,	 these	 clinics	have	 set	up	a	desk,	
within	 the	 universities,	 where	 foreigners	 go	 personally	 and	 are	 received	 by	 students	 who	
listen	to	their	problems.	






therefore,	 is	 conceived	 as	 a	way	 of	 being	 on	 a	market	 characterized	by	 the	development	 of	
                                                
5	“Nascita	e	diffusione	delle	cliniche	legali”,	document	of	the	“Cesare	Beccaria”	Department	of	Legal	Sciences	of	Milan	University,	
accessible	 from	the	page	on	“Legal	Clinics”	 (http://www.beccaria.unimi.it/ecm/home/legalclinics),	which	symptomatically	and	





supplementing	 the	 traditional	 teaching	of	 law,	based	on	 the	 identity	of	normative	 texts	 and	




Emphasis	 on	 the	 professionalizing	 aspect	 also	 minimizes	 the	 value	 of	 the	 social	 justice	
proposals	 that	mark	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 legal	 clinics	 and	 their	 spread.	 Even	when	 they	 declare	
their	will	 to	continue	the	 line	that	characterized	their	boom	in	the	United	States,	recovering	
the	attention	for	the	rights	of	marginal	or	weak	subjects,	Italian	legal	clinics,	like	many	of	the	
current	 ones	 in	 the	United	 States,	 seem	at	 best	 to	 remind	 the	 ‘market	 player’	 jurist	 that	 he	
must	 also	 carry	 out	 a	 pro	 bono	 activity	 for	 noble	 causes.	 According	 to	 a	 Kantian	 and	
Protestant	 approach,	we	move	 from	 the	 social	 to	 the	 individual	 level,	 from	access	 to	 justice	
conceived	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 change	 power	 structures	 to	 calling	 the	 individual	 to	 ethical-moral	
values,	 if	not	simply	to	reminding	the	professional	of	his	“deontological	duties”.	Attention	to	
marginal	people	is	not	declined	as	a	‘right	building’	that	favours	their	empowerment,	but	as	a	
reminder	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 success,	 measured	 in	 economic	 terms	 –	 to	 which,	 however,	 a	
commitment	 to	 ‘a	 humanitarian	 case’,	 spent	 on	 social	 media,	 can	 contribute	 significantly	 –	










The	 picture	 I	 have	 sketched	 depicts	 the	 spread	 of	 the	 clinical-legal	method	 in	 Italy	 as	 a	
phenomenon	that	looks	back	instead	of	forward,	a	belated	attempt	to	catch	up	with	needs	that	
were	emphasized	in	the	world	of	civil	 law	as	in	that	of	common	law	in	the	1930s.	Under	the	
pressure	 of	 the	 urgent	 need	 to	 make	 room	 for	 learning	 the	 practice,	 today’s	 discovery	 of	
teaching	methods	born	in	the	tradition	of	common	law	and	linked	to	 it,	simply	and	partially	
values	 its	 centuries-long	 rejection	 of	 the	 very	 idea	 of	 a	 university	 teaching	 of	 law8,	 and	 its	
                                                
6	The	verse	goes	on	like	this:	“You	know	I	lost	two	children”;	“Madam,	you	are	one	absent-minded	woman”.	
7	 “We	can	easily	 imagine	people	amusing	themselves	 in	a	 field	by	playing	with	a	ball	so	as	 to	start	various	existing	games,	but	
playing	many	without	finishing	them	and	in	between	throwing	the	ball	aimlessly	into	the	air,	chasing	one	another	with	the	ball	









claim	 that	 law	 itself	 is	 a	 practice	 that	 can	only	be	 taught	 in	 the	 Inns	 of	 Court.	On	 the	 other	
hand,	 the	 deep	 theoretical	 difference	 between	 viewing	 law	 as	 a	 tradition	 (first	 customary,	
then	 judicial)	 and	 as	 a	 body	 of	 normative	 texts	 is	 ignored.	 This	 completely	 neglects	 the	










only	 Italian,	 show,	 it	 lends	 itself	 very	 well	 as	 an	 ancillary	 tool	 of	 the	 traditional	 way	 of	
teaching,	strengthening	its	professionalizing	aspects.9	Only	if	the	clinical	approach	is	used	out	
of	 the	 conviction	 that,	 even	 before	 the	 ways	 of	 teaching	 law,	 the	 conception	 of	 law	 being	





orientation	 to	 social	 justice.	 This	 intelligent	 suggestion	 stems	 from	 the	 vaguely	 social	
















Advice	 Centre)	 is	 therefore	 interesting,	 symptomatic	 of	 both	 the	 evolution	 of	 law	 teaching	 in	 England,	 and	 of	 the	
marketing/professionalizing	pressure.	
9	According	 to	 the	 ‘enthusiasts’	 (Bloch	 and	Menon	2012,	 271)	 the	methodology	of	 legal	 clinics	 that	 is	 spreading	prepares	 law	
students	“to	understand	and	assimilate	their	responsibilities	as	members	of	a	public	profession	in	the	administration	of	the	law,	
in	the	reform	of	the	law,	in	the	equitable	distribution	of	legal	services	in	society,	in	the	protection	of	individual	rights	and	public	




increase	 the	 welfare	 of	 society”,	 the	 “economic	 valorisation	 of	 knowledge”.	 Indicators	 for	
measuring	universities’	activity	 in	 this	 field	 include	obtained	patents	or	 spin-offs.	The	 latter	
are	 companies	 that	 exploit	 the	 commercial	 potential	 of	 innovation	 produced	 by	 university	
research	 that	 cannot	 find	 an	 adequate	 space	 on	 the	 market	 on	 its	 own:	 we	 could	 imagine	
university	law	firms	as	activities	of	the	Third	Mission.	
I	 hope	 that	 the	 clinical	 approach	will	 be	 a	 didactic	 tool	 used	not	 to	 combine	 a	 practical-
professional	part	with	traditional	courses	based	on	normative	texts,	but	to	radically	revise	the	
teaching	of	law.	This	tool	can	and	must	be	used	not	to	support,	but	to	oppose	the	professional	
reduction	of	 university	 teaching,	which	 in	 the	 long	 run	will	 lead	 to	 the	 annihilation	of	 legal	
knowledge.	Legal	clinics	are	an	opportunity	to	do	a	job	of	great	cultural	value,	even	more	than	
professional,	a	job	which,	I	should	like	to	say,	is	the	work	of	universities.	In	other	words,	they	
are	an	opportunity	 to	 reaffirm,	going	 in	 the	opposite	direction	 from	what	was	suggested	by	
the	“Bologna	Process”,	that	one	thing	is	university	courses	and	another	is	those	of	the	Radio	
Elettra	School.10	Legal	clinics	are	interesting,	 in	my	opinion,	 if	 they	allow	us	to	establish	this	
distinction,	not	to	collapse	it.	
If	 law	faculties	choose	to	reduce	legal	clinics	to	a	mere	professionalizing	tool,	they	miss	a	
historic	opportunity	 to	rethink	 the	 teaching	of	 law,	abandoning	an	 ideological	conception	of	
the	legal	phenomenon	that	its	scholars	have	known,	for	at	least	half	a	century,	to	be	outdated.	
The	clinical	method,	 if	not	used	 in	an	ancillary	way	with	respect	 to	 traditional	 teaching,	can	
instead	 be	 the	 pivot	 of	 legal	 degree	 courses	 capable	 of	 shaping	 critical	 autonomy	 and	
therefore	of	producing	innovative	and	non-conformist	students.	
The	 task	of	 legal	 clinic-based	education	should	be	 to	 teach	prospective	 jurists	 to	address	
the	 problems	 individuals	 face	 and	 the	 conflicts	 they	 experience,	 enabling	 them	 to	 provide	
their	clients	with	the	tools	to	proceduralise	and	overcome	them.	The	legal	clinical	method	is	
an	opportunity,	 in	other	words,	 to	develop	a	 teaching	 capable	of	making	 the	 student	 aware	
that	 his	 task	 is	 not	 to	 be	 a	 cog	 in	 a	massive	 regulatory	mechanism,	 to	 subsume	 a	 fact	 or	 a	




readings,	 is	built	 from	below,	 from	 the	problem	and	 the	proposed	 conflict,	 and	develops	by	
building	 together	 the	 legal	 problem	 (the	 “case”)	 and	 its	 regulating	 rule.	 It	 is	 thanks	 to	 this	
feature	that	it	can	serve	social	justice	by	teaching	students	to	care	about	how	to	‘build’	access	
to	justice	for	those	who	have	never	even	thought	that	their	problem	had	legal	dignity.	
If,	 instead	 of	 looking	 at	 the	 needs	 emphasised	 by	 Carnelutti	 in	 1935	 and	 neglected	 for	
about	eighty	years,	we	looked	at	the	epistemological	reflections	that	have	developed	since	the	
mid-1960s	and	have	always	been	 ignored	by	 legal	science	and	 law	courses,	 then	the	clinical	
                                                
10	 The	 “About	 us”	 page	 of	 the	 School’s	 website	 (http://www.scuolaradioelettra.it/)	 reads:	 “SCUOLA	 RADIO	 ELETTRA.	
Professional	 training	 since	1951.	An	 accredited	 centre	 for	 professional	 training,	 Scuola	Radio	Elettra	 provides	 theoretical	 and	
practical	 courses	 strongly	 oriented	 towards	 the	world	 of	work.	 The	 training	 offer,	 originally	 specialised	 in	 plant	 engineering,	




method	 could	 serve	 to	 radically	 change	 our	 teachings.	 Legal	 clinics	 could	 be	 the	 pivot	 of	
degree	courses	premised	on	the	assumption	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	“legal	science”.	But	
the	 basis	 of	 this	 assumption	 would	 not	 be	 the	 old	 discussion	 between	 the	 deductive	
nomological	 model	 and	 the	 interpretive	 model,	 between	 the	 scientific	 method	 and	 the	
historical	method.	Rather,	as	we	learned	from	the	“linguistic	turn”	and	from	Kuhn’s	use	of	it	in	
his	masterly	book	on	The	 structure	of	 scientific	 revolutions,	 it	would	be	 the	notion	 that	even	
‘sciences’	 are	 but	 discourses.	 Legal	 clinics	 could	 be	 an	 opportunity	 to	 recognize	 that	 for	 a	
century	 the	 idea	of	 legal	 syllogism	was	 the	pivot	of	an	 ideological	operation	 that	 structured	
the	organization	of	power	in	liberal-democratic	societies	and	formed	jurists’	mentality,	their	
Denkstil	(Fleck,	1935).	
If	 we	 took	 the	 legal-realist	 matrix	 of	 the	 clinical	 method	 seriously,	 we	 could	 use	 it	 not	
(only)	 to	 develop	 a	 teaching	 that	 takes	 the	 features	 of	 contemporary	 law	 and	 its	
transformations	into	account.	Clinics	provide	an	opportunity	to	teach	law	as	something	that	is	
created	 daily	 by	 a	 community	 of	 jurists	 who	 work	 in	 the	 hiatus	 existing	 between	 the	
normative	text,	produced	by	legislators,	and	the	norm,	built	by	the	community	itself	through	
dialogue,	 cross-critical	 scrutiny	 and	 review	 through	 different	 court	 levels.	 They	 provide	 an	
opportunity	to	bring	to	the	fore	this	awareness,	that	the	Enlightenment	ideology	(normativist,	
formalist,	 imperativist,	etc.)	 relegated	 for	decades	 to	 legal	 theorists’	discourses,	cultural	and	
non-professionalizing,	 or	 to	 practitioners’	 background	 awareness,	 which	 does	 not	 interfere	
with	their	activities	(“I	know	of	Einstein’s	theory	of	relativity,	but	to	do	things	in	everyday	–	
professional	–	life	the	Newton	system	is	fine”).	Legal	clinics	must	be	the	tool	to	teach	students	
not	 a	 professionalizing	 ‘doing’,	 how	 to	 use	 legal	 science	 in	 practice,	 how	 to	 perform	
subsumption,	but	a	‘making’	that	is,	first	and	foremost,	a	cultural	break.	
In	 order	 to	 carry	 out	 this	 operation	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 turn	 to	American	 realism,	 just	
look	at	the	Italian	one	and	in	particular	at	Giovanni	Tarello’s	work.	The	Genoese	legal	theorist	
was	 in	 fact,	 in	 Italy,	 the	 most	 determined	 and	 shrewd	 critic	 of	 the	 theory	 that	 legal	




in	 legal	 practice,	 “different	 operators,	 at	 different	 times	 or	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 for	 different	
purposes	or	pursuing	the	same	purposes	with	different	means,	identify	different	and	perhaps	
conflicting	norms	in	the	same	legislative	texts.”12	
Clinics	 are	 the	 tool	 to	 finally	 develop	 a	 teaching	 based	 on	 the	 consideration	 that	 the	
normative	 statements,	 contained	 in	 the	 legal	 sources,	 are	never	 open	 to	 one	 interpretation,	
but	 rather	 to	 a	 plurality	 of	 interpretations,	 none	 of	 which	 is	 for	 that	 very	 reason	 ‘true’.	
                                                
11	Tarello’s	argumentative	path	began	with	“Il	 ‘problema	dell’interpretazione’:	una	formulazione	ambigua”	of	1966	followed	by	




12	On	Tarello’s	 teaching	see	 the	 first	chapter	of	Guastini,	2017.	On	the	distinction	between	normative	 text	and	norm,	see	again	




Whether	 an	 interpretation	 is	 admissible	 or	 not,	 what	 are	 the	 norms	 for	 which	 there	 are	
“assertability	 conditions”,	 is	 decided,	 in	 different	 historical	 moments,	 by	 the	 community	 of	
interpreters	 (cf.	 Santoro,	 2008,	 p.	 281-334),	 that	 is,	 the	 jurists	 or,	 as	Tarello	 (1967,	 p.	 205)	
says,	the	“internal	legal	culture”.	In	this	‘realist’	conception	of	law,	every	article	of	law,	every	
paragraph,	is	not	a	norm,	but	a	battlefield	in	which	various	actors	clash	to	define	the	‘norm’	to	




“legal	 building”	 (see	 Guastini,	 2011,	 p.	 105-228	 and	 2017,	 p.	 20	 and	 80),	 that	 is,	 how	 the	
meaning	 of	 a	 normative	 text,	 the	 techniques	 used	 to	 argue	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 norm	 derived	
from	it,	are	produced.	Clinics	seem	to	be	a	particularly	suitable	didactic	tool	to	explain	that	in	













wheel,	 the	 legislator,	 but	 that,	 whenever	 they	 exercise	 their	 profession,	 they	 will	 make	
intrinsically	 and	 inevitably	 political	 choices.	 Clinical	 teaching	 is,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	
instrument	 to	make	 jurists	 immediately	understand	 that,	 regardless	of	 the	criterion	guiding	












justice,	 towards	the	building	of	a	 law	that	enables	weak	people	to	have	access	to	 justice.	On	
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stimulating	 students’	 imagination	 on	 how	 to	 defend	 the	 weak	 and	marginalized,	 or	 rather,	
using	a	broader	expression	 that	better	 conveys	 the	 idea	of	 the	enterprise,	on	how	 to	 create	
their	 rights.	But	 they	can	also	be	simply	professionalizing,	giving	 law	students	 the	ability	 to	
build	 the	 law	that	 is	most	 in	demand	and	best	paid	by	the	market,	 they	can	 initiate	 them	to	
build	a	law	firm	as	a	spin-off	of	their	activity.	
A	 legal	 clinic	 can	make	 this	 choice	primarily	 through	 its	own	 thematic	 area.	Attention	 to	
social	 justice	 also,	 or	 perhaps	 above	 all,	 shows	 up	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 legal	 clinics	 have	mostly	
developed	 in	 areas	 that	more	 often	 and	more	 problematically	 involve	weak	 people	 (family	




of	prisoners’	 rights.	Thus,	a	significant	part	of	 the	US	 legal	clinics	deals	with	both	offenders,	
during	 the	 trial	 and	 then	 in	 the	 execution	 phase	 of	 the	 sentence	 –	 i.e.	 individuals	 whose	
fundamental	 rights	 claims	 appear	 to	 be	 undermined	 by	 their	 behaviour	 –	 and	 victims	 (e.g.	






to	 combine	 Mauro	 Cappelletti’s	 views	 on	 access	 to	 justice	 with	 those	 of	 the	 American	
sociologist	 Charles	Wright	Mills	 on	 the	 “sociological	 imagination”.	 For	 Cappelletti,	 access	 to	
justice	is	not	only	an	individual	right	to	be	universalised,	but	an	indicator	whose	development	
measures	“a	ceaseless	social	progress,	which	implies	a	constant	debate	both	on	the	modes	of	
access	 and	 on	 the	 resulting	 idea	 of	 justice”	 (Cappelletti-Garth	 1981,	 I	 owe	 the	 quotation	 to	
Marella-Rigo	 2015,	 539-40).	 For	 his	 part,	 Mills	 (1959)	 urged	 sociologists	 interested	 in	
defending	marginal	people	to	develop	a	“sociological	imagination”,	that	is,	a	language	capable	
of	putting	women	and	men	 in	a	position	 to	 transform	 their	 “personal	 troubles”	 into	 “public	
issues”.	 Similarly,	 the	 legal	 clinics	 that	 intend	 to	be	 attentive	 to	marginal	 people’s	 access	 to	
justice	 must	 develop,	 to	 recall	 the	 title	 of	 an	 essay	 by	 Pietro	 Costa,	 “legal	 imagination”:	 a	
discourse	 capable	 of	 transforming	 the	 “private	 troubles”	 of	 marginal	 people	 into	 legal	
problems,	 into	 claims	 to	 be	 brought	 before	 a	 judge.	 Costa	 writes	 (1995,	 p.	 33-34),	 at	 the	
conclusion	of	his	essay	(which	every	jurist	should	read	and	meditate	on):	
	
Judges	 act	 as	 institutional	 resolvers	 of	 conflicts	 in	 the	 light	 of	 an	 order	
(apparently)	already	given	and	motionless,	which	however	unfolds	its	project	
potential	 at	 the	 very	 time	 when	 judges	 reformulate	 it	 as	 a	 function	 of	 an	
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intersubjective	 dynamic	 that	 is	 always	 new	 and	 different.	 Legal	 imagination	
unfolds	in	a	story	suspended	programmatically	between	a	depicted	order	that	
exists	 only	 as	 ‘described’	 (in	 the	 jurist’s	 possible	 world)	 and	 a	 developing	




classify	marginality	 conditions	 as	 ‘private	 troubles’,	 to	 a	 project,	which	will	 exist	 only	 as	 it	 is	
built	by	jurists,	in	which	they	rise	to	that	particular	configuration	of	a	public	issue	that	is	a	‘court	
case’.	
‘Troubles’,	 in	 Mills’	 vocabulary,	 are	 personal	 issues,	 whose	 definition	 and	 resolution	 are	
considered	by	the	 individual	as	an	operation	to	be	carried	out	 in	his	 immediate	environment,	
that	is,	in	the	social	framework	that	is	directly	open	to	his	personal	experience,	in	the	context	of	
his	immediate	relations	with	his	neighbours,	and,	within	limits,	through	his	voluntary	activity.	
‘Issues’	 instead	 are	 problems	 that	 transcend	 an	 individual’s	 particular	 environment	 and	 the	
boundaries	of	his	inner	life.	‘Issues’	are	the	responsibility	of	the	institutions	of	a	historic	society;	
they	arise	from	the	overlapping	and	interweaving	of	power	relationships	and	social	structures	
that	provide	 the	 framework	within	which	 individual	 lives	 are	 articulated.	The	 resolution	of	 a	
problem	 seems	 impossible	 without	 an	 institutional	 intervention	 that	 modifies	 supposedly	
structural	 conditions.	 The	 work	 of	 transformation	 that	 jurists	 have	 to	 do	 is	 different,	 more	
technical	 than	 what	 Mills	 asked	 sociologists:	 jurists	 have	 to	 transform	 private	 troubles	 into	
claims	that	can	be	brought	before	a	judge.	
People	do	not	usually	see	their	‘troubles’	in	terms	of	historical	changes,	they	do	not	consider	
them	 ‘public	 issues’,	 they	 are	 driven	 by	 the	 style	 of	 thinking	 around	 them	 to	 attribute	 the	
welfare	they	enjoy	or	the	misery	they	suffer	to	their	own	responsibility	and	to	take	charge	of	the	
blame,	 or	 to	 boast	 of	 the	 merit,	 for	 their	 own	 conditions.	 Mills	 described	 sociological	
imagination	 as	 the	 language	 that	 allows	 individuals	 to	 trace,	 in	 the	 chaos	 of	 everyday	
experience,	 the	 broad	 lines	 that	make	up	 the	 fabric	 of	modern	 society,	 and	 to	 ‘see’	 how	 they	
condition	their	affairs.	Even	less	normally	do	marginalised	people	have	the	tools	to	identify	the	
solution	 to	 their	 ‘personal	 troubles’	 in	 claiming	 rights	 to	 be	 respected.	 In	 order	 to	 transform	
private	troubles	into	legal	problems,	the	operation	of	law	must	see	the	intertwining	of	powers	
(economic,	 social,	physical,	 etc.)	 that	 lies	behind	 those	 troubles,	 and	understand	 if	 and	how	a	
power	 can	be	 activated	 autonomous	 from	 the	 social	 stratification	of	 power:	 the	 legal	 one.	As	
Weber	 taught	 us,	 in	 fact,	 legal	 power	 often	 serves	 to	 compensate	 the	 other	 social	 powers,	
bridging	the	‘power’	gap	that	afflicts	marginal	people.	
The	 terms	 ‘see’	 and	 ‘language’	 are	 closely	 related	 and	 decisive	 for	 transforming	 ‘private	
troubles’	into	claims	that	can	be	brought	before	a	judge.	It	is	language	that	allows	us	to	describe	
and	catalogue	the	situations	we	live	in,	imagining	the	strategies	to	deal	with	them.13	
                                                
13	George	Orwell	 in	1984,	with	 the	metaphor	of	 the	“newspeak”,	 to	which	 the	appendix	of	 the	work	entitled	“The	Principles	of	







case,	 possibly	 underlining	 the	 post-colonial	 responsibilities	 of	 Western	 states,	 at	 the	
institutional	 level	and	in	the	political	debate,	of	how	the	 international	community	can	take	on	
the	task	of	guaranteeing	the	 lives	of	people	born	in	Mali	and	saving	them	from	the	massacres	
being	 carried	out	 there,	 transforming	 that	 “personal	 trouble”	 into	 a	 “public	 issue”,	 is	 the	 task	
that	Mills	entrusted	to	the	sociological	imagination.	To	guarantee	to	those	born	in	northern	Mali,	
without	 risking	 their	 lives	 in	 the	 crossing	 of	 Libya	 and	 the	 Mediterranean,	 a	 (possibly	
successful)	 access	 to	 the	 asylum	 procedure,	 is	 the	 task	 of	 the	 legal	 imagination:	 a	 jurist	
undertakes	this	task	by	elaborating	an	imaginary	order,	where	all	people’s	fundamental	rights	
are	guaranteed,	and	presenting	it	to	a	judge	for	her	to	make	it	actual.	
Through	 what	 sociologists	 call	 a	 “process	 of	 objectification”,	 language	 gives	 situations	
identity	and	meaning,	making	them	“objective”.	They	are	learned	and	internalized	by	users	of	a	




as	 appropriate	 conduct	 to	 keep	 in	 certain	 circumstances.	 The	 process	 of	 transforming	
appropriate	types	of	conduct	into	rules	is	favoured	by	the	fact	that	incentives	and	disincentives	




connotation	 becomes	 common	 sense,	 that	 is,	 it	 becomes	part	 of	 the	 definitions	 shared	 in	 the	
reality	of	everyday	life.	
When	 Mills	 thought	 of	 sociological	 imagination	 as	 a	 language	 capable	 of	 transforming	
“private	troubles”	into	“public	issues”,	he	thought	of	a	new	language	capable	of	influencing	the	
mechanisms	of	objectifying	situations	and	the	types	of	conduct	appropriate	to	deal	with	them,	
and	therefore	the	mechanisms	of	rules	 internalisation	and	formation.	His	 idea	 is	based	on	the	
fact	that	the	process	of	objectification	of	 language	is	biunivocal:	past	objectification	structures	
language,	 and	 therefore	 the	 world,	 but	 it	 is	 the	 use	 of	 language	 that	 allows	 the	 world	 to	 be	
structured.	So	when	a	language	changes	the	way	things	are	seen,	makes	them	no	longer	be	seen	
as	 private	 troubles	 but	 as	 public	 issues,	 it	 changes	 how	 the	 world	 is	 structured	 and,	
consequently,	how	the	speakers	will	internalize	the	world	itself.	
Legal	discourse	and	the	judicial	decisions	that	mark	it	certainly	play	an	important	role	in	the	
process	of	objectifying	 reality.	The	 legal	 system,	 in	other	words,	 in	our	 societies	 is	not	only	a	
practical	instrument	of	regulation,	but	also,	and	above	all,	a	way	to	strengthen	a	binding	system	
of	 beliefs	 and	 to	 give	 meaning	 to	 everyday	 life.	 The	 “jurist’s	 imagination”	 is	 therefore	 a	
fundamental	 tool	 to	 trigger	 the	 (cultural)	 process,	 to	 transform	 public	 indifference	 to	








Jurists’	 discourse	 has	 a	 fundamental	 importance	 on	 how	 the	 conditions	 of	 weakness	 are	
objectified	and	internalized,	and	become	part	of	common	sense.	Only	if	their	use	of	normative	
texts	 is	 based	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 offering	 forms	 of	 legal	 protection	 (rights)	 and	
proceduralisation	 of	 conflicts	 can	 interpreters	 help	 to	 restore	 a	 dignified	 life	 to	marginalised	
persons.	 To	 achieve	 this	 goal,	 jurists	 must	 learn	 to	 use	 their	 “imagination”	 to	 develop	 a	









The	 Law	 School	 of	 Florence	 University	 accepted	 the	 proposal	 of	 “L’altro	 diritto”,	 inter-
university	research	centre	on	prison,	deviance,	marginalisation	and	migration	governance,	to	




the	 ‘Florentine	 school’	whose	 protagonists	 and	 great	masters	were	 Paolo	Grossi	 and	 Pietro	
Costa.	On	 the	other	hand,	 through	 the	courses	 in	 legal	philosophy	which	 from	the	 first	year	




crisis	 of	 the	hierarchy	of	 sources	 and	perhaps	of	 the	 very	 concept	 of	 legal	 source.	 For	Ross	
taught	us	that	it	is	the	interpreters’	community	that	‘invents’	the	sources	of	law	and	not	these	
that	 ‘create’	 law.	 This	 ‘cultural’	 line	 is	 also	 developed	 through	 the	 course	 of	 legal	
















clinics	 aimed	 at	 stimulating	 students’	 imagination	 so	 that	 they	 can	 ‘construct’	 ways	 of	




their	very	names:	 they	are	not	 legal	 clinics	on	sentence	execution,	asylum	or	ECtHR,	but	on	
“The	 rights	 of	 applicants	 for	 international	 protection”,	 “The	 protection	 of	 the	 sentenced	




students	 become	 familiar	 with	 the	 specialised	 legal	 discourses.	 Then,	 they	 go	 to	 work	
alongside	the	judges	of	the	specialised	Section	for	Immigration	or	the	Supervisory	Court	and,	
for	 the	 clinic	 on	 asylum	 seekers’	 rights,	 the	 operators	 of	 reception	 centres,	 preparing	
applicants	 for	 the	 interview	 with	 the	 Asylum	 Commission.	 Students	 also	 work	 with	 the	
volunteers	 of	 the	 Altro	 diritto	 NGO,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 agreement	 with	 the	 Department	 of	
Prison	Administration.	Within	several	Italian	prisons,	Altro	diritto	has	activated	a	number	of	
counters	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 prisoners’	 rights,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 supporting	 the	 latter	 in	
drafting	complaints	to	the	Supervisory	Judges	and	other	competent	authorities.	
This	choice	has	been	made,	on	the	one	hand,	to	ensure	that	students	always	start	from	the	
experience	 of	 people	 stating	 their	 “personal	 trouble”	 and	 giving	 their	 own	 account	 of	 this	
“trouble”,	and	do	not	have	intermediaries	who	transform	in	advance	the	“personal	trouble”	in	
a	 legal	 case.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 so	 that	 students	 can	 always	 compare	 the	 initial	 “personal	
trouble”	with	the	decision	that	gives	 it	a	 legal	connotation	and	how	it	 is	made,	and	critically	
evaluate	the	judge’s	political	choice.	We	have	chosen	to	support	the	magistrates	because	the	
Specialized	Section	for	Immigration	of	the	Florence	Court	rightly	considers	it	its	duty	to	listen	
to	 applicants	 for	 international	 protection.	 Students	 then	 listen	 to	 the	 story,	 the	 personal	




sentenced	 persons,	 how	 the	 experience,	 the	 personal	 trouble,	 comes,	 step	 by	 step,	
bureaucratised,	transformed	into	a	legal-administrative	fact	and	how	this	construction	affects	
the	effectiveness	of	people’s	rights.	





clinic,	 these	 difficulties	 notwithstanding,	 because,	 as	 mentioned,	 conventional	 law	 is,	 by	
explicit	 and	 repeated	 claim	of	 the	Court	 itself,	 a	 law	 that	 rejects	 the	 traditional	 relationship	
with	the	text.	The	Court	explicitly	states	that	it	does	not	think	of	itself	and	does	not	want	to	be	
the	“mouth	of	the	law”,	but	that	it	wants	to	be	the	“creator”	of	the	text’s	meaning	according	to	
the	 consensus	 on	 the	 minimum	 level	 of	 protection	 prevailing	 in	 the	 Greater	 Europe,	 the	
Europe	 composed	 of	 the	 forty-seven	Member	 States	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe.	 Such	 a	 claim	
makes	it	unique	on	the	European	scene.	
In	a	legal-realist	framework,	which	aims	to	present	the	jurist’s	work	as	a	‘construction’,	in	
dialogue	 with	 the	 other	 jurists,	 starting	 from	 the	 rule’s	 normative	 text	 to	 protect	 certain	
interests,	 it	 has	 finally	 appeared	 of	 great	 cultural	 importance	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 work	 of	 the	
ECtHR	 as	 the	 most	 illustrious	 example	 of	 an	 actor	 who	 carries	 out	 this	 work	 openly	 and	
transparently.	 A	 cultural	 option	 such	 as	 the	 one	 underlying	 the	 Florentine	 clinics	 cannot	
overlook	 the	 activity	 of	 a	 Court	 that	 has	 used	 its	 legal	 imagination	 to	 build	 the	 right	 to	
economic	 social	 benefits	 under	 Article	 1	 of	 the	 First	 Protocol,	 which	 protects	 the	 right	 to	
property,	 in	spite	of	 the	centuries-old	 liberal	 tradition	 that	opposed	the	right	 to	property	 to	
social	rights.16	
Finally,	 with	 regard	 to	 access	 to	 justice,	 which	 defines	 the	 level	 of	 legal	 civilisation,	 it	
should	be	remembered	that	the	Court	has,	on	a	theoretical	level,	severed	entitlement	to	rights	
from	nationality,17	with	a	radically	legal-realist	approach,	but	also	shared	by	Kelsen,	who	saw	












the	 victim	 of	 the	 violation.	 Insofar	 as	 a	 right	 is	 a	 legal	 situation,	 a	 claim	 or	 an	 immunity	
(Hohfeld	 1953,	 Ross	 1958,	 149-159)	whose	 legal	 protection	 is	 the	 possibility	 to	 apply	 to	 a	
                                                












For	 the	 first	 time,	 the	universal	nature	of	 rights	 is	matched	by	 the	actual	 and	systematic	
possibility	of	 their	 judicial	 enforcement,	 regardless	of	 the	 right	holder’s	 state,	provided	 that	
the	violation	is	committed	by	a	state	party	to	the	Convention.	
A	final	reason	for	creating	the	clinic	on	the	protection	of	rights	before	the	ECtHR	was	that	
there	 are	 still	 no	 courses	 in	 Italian	 universities	 specifically	 devoted	 to	 the	 Convention	 on	
Human	Rights	“as	interpreted	by	the	Court”.	And	this	although	the	Convention	has	entered	the	
Italian	 legal	 system	 from	 the	 top	 levels,	 “from	 the	 attic”	 if	 I	 may	 say	 so,	 through	 how	 the	
Constitutional	 Court	 has	 created	 the	 meaning	 of	 Article	 117	 of	 the	 Italian	 Fundamental	
Charter	 to	 frame	 the	 relationship	 between	 its	 case-law	 and	 that	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 and	 to	
substantiate	the	principle	of	subsidiarity	underpinning	the	relationship	between	state	law	and	
conventional	law.	In	the	context	of	the	legal	clinics	created	to	develop	the	imagination	capable	
of	making	marginal	people’s	personal	 troubles	 into	 legal	 claims,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	
conventional	law	should	also	enter	the	Italian	legal	system	from	the	lower	levels,	I	would	say,	
to	continue	with	the	metaphor,	“from	the	cellar”.	In	fact,	for	some	years	now,	by	introducing	a	
case-law	 source	 into	 the	 Italian	 legal	 system	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 Article	 35-ter	 of	 the	
Penitentiary	 Law	 has	 provided	 that	 a	 person	may	 ask	 the	 supervisory	magistrate	 or,	when	
released,	 the	 civil	 judge	 for	 compensation	 for	 having	 been	 detained	 “in	 such	 detention	
conditions	 as	 to	 violate	Article	3	of	 the	Convention	 for	 the	Protection	of	Human	Rights	 and	
Fundamental	Freedoms,	 ratified	under	Law	No.	848	of	4	August	1955,	as	 interpreted	by	 the	
European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights”	 (italics	 of	 course	mine).	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 clinic	 on	 the	
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